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A COMPARISON OF THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF BUYERS
AND SELLERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE AND THE UNIFORM SALES ACT*
The major objective in making this comparison of the rights and
remedies of buyers and sellers under the Uniform Sales Act adopted

in Kentucky in 1928 and the Uniform Commercial Code adopted by
the Legislature in 1958, which repealed the Sales Act and became
effective July 1, 1960, is to provide a treatment of the field of rights
and remedies which is sufficiently comprehensive for a general working reference yet not so lengthy as to require an excessive amount of
time for reading.

Primary emphasis is placed upon the conditions upon which the
various rights and remedies arose under the Sales Act and how they
have been affected by the Code. The additional rights and remedies
provided by the Code will be similarly treated. No attempt is made
to exhaustively describe what will constitute the requisite elements
(i.e., notice, acceptance, reasonable commercial judgment, etc.) upon
which the rights and remedies are predicated. Similarly the manner
in which the rights may be given effect cannot be properly treated due
to space limitation. The statement of the nature of the right or
remedy, a comparison with its counterpart and of the conditions upon
which both depend, in addition to the new Code provisions, will
adequately fulfill the purposes of this article.
The article is divided into three parts to simplify treatment and
enhance organization. The passage of title and its relative importance
prefaces: (1) The seller's rights with respect to the goods; (2) The
seller's remedies; and (8) The buyer's remedies.
The Relative Importance of Title Passage
"Title" or "property" in the goods was extremely important under
the Sales Act and the rights and remedies of the parties in many
insances were directly dependent upon the location of title. The principle upon which the Code is drawn is quite the contrary. This is
reflected in Section 2-401, official comment 1 in the following terms:
* The present official citation to the Uniform Commercial Code is: Ky. Acts
1958, Ch. 77, Legis. Research Comm'n Bull. No. 24 (1959). It will be referred
to in this article as the "Code" and the footnote abbreviation used is "UCC". The
Uniform Sales Act is included in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 361,
(repealed, Ky. Acts 1958, ch. 77 § 10-102) the section numbers of which
correspond to the section numbers of the Sales Act, i.e., KRS 861.010, is section
1, KRS 361.020 is section 2, etc., of the Sales Act. The Act is referred to in the
text as the "Sales Act" and the footnote abbreviation used is "USA". Comments
on particular sections of the Code are the official comments to the 1957 draft.
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NOTES
This article deals with the issues between seller and buyer in
terms of step by step performance or non-performance under the
contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not "title" to the
goods has passed.

Thus, one major factor upon which rights and remedies under the
Sales Act depended is virtually eliminated. This aspect of the Code
has been cogently criticized.1 However, the Code was adopted with
so interpreted,
this principle firmly embedded and presumably will be
3
resulting in title passage 2 being of minor importance.
I. The Seller's Rights with Respect to the Goods
A. The Right of Lien, the right to Retain, the Right to Withhold
An unpaid seller,4 within the meaning of the Sales Act, had a
lien on the goods or a right to retain them for the price if he were in
possession of the goods, even where title had passed to the buyer.5
Similarly if title had not passed and the seller were in possession he
had a right to withhold delivery. 6 The right to retain or withhold
under the Sales Act were rights which only an unpaid seller within
the meaning of the Act could exercise. The Code is not so limited.
Irrespective of title passage there are four situations which will enable
a seller to withhold delivery under the Code. If the buyer wrongfully
(1) rejects the goods, (2) revokes his acceptance, (8) fails to make
payment due on or before delivery, or (4) repudiates the contract 7 in
whole or in part8 the seller will be entitled to withhold delivery.9
Only in number (3) above, would the seller have been "unpaid"
within the Sales Act, yet in three other instances under the Code a
seller is given the right to withhold. In the other three instances it
may not be necessary to exercise the right, however, it nevertheless
exists. An example of how it may be desirable to exercise the right
1 Williston, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,"
63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 568 (1950).
2 "Title passage" under the Uniform Sales Act is governed by §§ 17-19.
3For the effect of "title passage" upon the law of Sales under the Uniform
Commercial Code, see UCC 2-401.
4An Unpaid Seller is defined in part in USA § 52 as follows:
(1) The seller of goods is deemed to be an unpaid seller...
(a) When the whole of the price has not been paid or tendered....
IUSA § 53 (1) (a).
0 USA § 53 (2).
7 The repudiation which will enable a seller to withhold delivery of the goods
includes an anticipatory repudiation. See UCC § 2-610 (b).
8 If the buyer breaches only with respect to a part of the contract then the
seller may withhold only with respect to the goods directly affected. See UCC
§ 2-703.
9 The four actions on the part of the buyer which give rise to the right to
withhold delivery as well as other rights and remedies are all included in UCO
§ 2-703.

KENTUcKY LAW OUNAL[o

[Vol. 49,

is where there has been a wrongful rejection and a subsequent demand
for delivery, in which case the seller could rightfully withhold delivery.
(The four situations above give rise to other rights to be discussed
infra, and reference will be made thereto in order to avoid unnecessary
duplication, by referring to them as the four situations in Section
2-703.)
B. The Right to Stop Goods in Transitu
An unpaid seller under the Sales Act was given the right to stop
goods in transit upon the buyer's insolvency. If title to the goods had
passed, the right was conferred by section 53 (1) (b) and if title had
not passed section 53 (2) provided a similar right. The only circumstance which would give rise to this right was the insolvency of the
buyer; consequently, repudiation of the contract by the buyer was
insufficient,' 0 although repudiation would entitle the seller to rescind
the entire contract.:"
A right of stoppage is also provided by the Code. The provisions
are broader and more detailed and in addition to permitting the
seller to stop any size shipment on the insolvency of the buyer, enable
the seller to stop particular size shipments on other conditions.' 2 If
the buyer repudiates the contract, fails to make payment due,' 3 or
fails to give adequate assurances of due performance when reasonable
grounds for the seller's insecurity arise, 14 the seller may stop carload,
planeload and truckload lots or larger shipments. 5 If the goods are
stopped upon the seller's insecurity and the assurances are duly
forthcoming, the seller's action is considered as merely a suspension
of performance which will not entitle the seller to resell or divert.'0
For purposes of the exercise of the right to stop, it is the stated
purpose of the Code that the goods will be considered in "transit" if
they are in the possession of a bailee who has not attorned to the
buyer.17 This provision may not substantially affect the result which
would have been reached under the Sales Act,' however, the stage of
303

Williston, Sales, § 520 (rev. ed. 1948).

11 Recission upon repudiation is discussed in part II, subtopic D, infra.
12 UCC § 2-705 (1).
'3 Ibid.
14 The right to stop on the seller's insecurity is derived from the right to
suspend performance under UCC § 2-609 until adequate assurances of the other
party's (the buyer's) performance is given. For a discussion of what will
constitute "reasonable grounds for insecurity" and "adequate assurances of performance" see UCC § 2-609, official comments 3 and 4.
15 UCC § 2-705 (1).
16 See UCC § 2-705, official comment 1.
17 UCC § 2-702, official comment 1.
18 See 3 Williston, Sales § 528 (rev. ed. 1948) and cases therein cited concerning the attornment which will terminate the right to stop.
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the transaction at which the right to stop is terminated is made more
explicit. This provision is apparently directed to those situations in
which the carrier-bailee has accepted the goods for the buyer only in
the sense that he has done so as a necessary incident to the contract
of carriage, in which case the right to stop would not be terminated.
The right to stop being extended under the Code to the enumerated
situations provides a greater protection for the seller in addition to
providing a method through which the buyer's damages may be
mitigated. Permitting the seller to stop upon the breach by the buyer
rather than upon the insolvency alone, will result in many instances,
in a mitigation of the buyer's damages through the reduction of transportation, handling and storage costs which would have been incurred
if the seller were permitted to stop only upon the buyer's insolvency.
C. The Right to Resell
Where title to the goods had passed and the unpaid seller had a
right of lien or had stopped the goods in transit; or, where title had
not passed and the unpaid seller was in possession of the goods or
had stopped them in transit, such seller had the right to resell the
goods under the Sales Act.' 9 The right was limited in that it could
be exercised only if one of the following circumstances existed;
(1) the goods were of a perishable nature, (2) the seller had reserved
the right upon the default of the buyer, or (3) the buyer had been in
default of payment an unreasonable time.2 0
The right of resale provided by the Code is not so limited. In any
of the four situations in section 2-703, the seller may exercise the
right. By permitting the seller to resell upon the wrongful rejection,
repudiation of acceptance, failure to make payment due, or repudiation
of the contract, the right has been substantially broadened. If the
goods were not perishable and no express provision for resale were
included in the contract, the only way the seller could resell under
the Sales Act was by waiting until the buyer had been in default an
unreasonable length of time. The only condition precedent to the
sale under the Code is that the buyer breach his contract within section
2-703. Further the seller under the Code is permitted to resell upon
the anticipatory repudiation by the buyer. 21 This would have been
impossible under the Sales Act unless the contract expressly provided,
since the seller would not have been unpaid until default by the buyer
19USA § 53 (1) (c) (if title has passed): USA § 53 (2) (if title has not
20 USA § 60.
21 UCC § 2-706, official comment 1.

passed.)
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on the due date. Further the Code expressly permits a seller, after
the buyer's breach, to resell goods demonstrably intended
for the
22
particular contract even though the goods are unfinished.
Under the Sales Act in order for the purchaser at the resale to
acquire good title as against the buyer in the original contract it was
necessary that the sale conform to the provisions of the Act. 23 On
the other hand, failure to comply with the resale provisions of the Code
will not preclude the buyer at the resale who purchases in good faith
24
from acquiring the goods free from any rights of the original buyer.
The seller, however, in order to recover the damages which may have
accrued under the Code must make
the resale in good faith and in a
25
commercially reasonable manner.
D. The Right to Rescind or Cancel
A seller under the Sales Act was given two separate and distinct
rights of rescission, the first, being the right to rescind the transfer of
title, which will be discussed here, and the second, i.e. the right to
rescind the entire contract or sale, will be discussed infra. The unpaid
seller who had a right of lien or who had stopped the goods in transit
was permitted to rescind the transfer of title, and resume the property
in the goods.2 6 This action could be taken by the seller when he had
reserved the right to do so in the contract, or when the buyer had
been in default an unreasonable length of time. If the seller rescinded
only the transfer of title, he was permitted to recover damages for
the breach of the contract. Only through this limited rescission could
the seller consistently demand damages for the breach. Certainly it
is inconsistent to rescind the entire contract, which in itself is a
tacit admission that the contract has ceased to exist, and then sue
27
thereon for damages for its breach.
The Code permits the seller in the four situations in section 2-703
to cancel the contract. This right of cancellation has the effect of
combining both rights of rescission under the Sales Act. A rightful
cancellation under the Code ends the contractual relationship with
the consequent discharge of all obligations of the seller. Moreover
the remedies under the Code being cumulative, 28 the seller will be
22
UCC § 2-704 (1) (b).
23
USA § 60 (2).
24 UCC § 2-706 (5).

25UCC § 2-706 (1).
§ 61 (1).
Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Jayne, 289 Ky. 150, 154, 158 S.W. 2d
398, 400 (1942).
28 UC § 2-703, official comment 1.
26
USA
27
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able to pursue any right or remedy which may have accrued" and
which is not barred by the cancellation.30 In safeguarding the rights
of a seller who has cancelled the contract, it is intended under the
Code that to forego any rights which have accrued the intention to do
so must clearly appear.3 ' It appears that such an intention can only
is "without
be shown by an express declaration that the cancellation
32
reservation of rights" or some equivalent statement.
The Code has thus extended the right of extinguishing the contract
to encompass more situations and at the same time retained the
opportunity for a seller to recover the losses he has sustained as a
result of the contractual relationship. Of great importance to sellers
is the fact that they will be able to cancel immediately upon the
breach without being compelled to wait until the buyer had been in
default an unreasonable time. Furthermore, it relieves them of insuring that they have properly rescinded only the transfer of title and not
the entire contract, thereby preserving their right to recover damages
for the breach.
E. The Right to Reclaim
A seller who was unpaid under the Sales Act could retain the goods
of which he was in possession,3 3 or stop goods in transit upon the
buyer's insolvency whether or not title had passed.3 4 Once, however,
both title and possession of the goods had passed to the buyer the
seller bad no right against the goods,33 nor did the Sales Act provide
for recovery of the goods upon the buyer's insolvency. Thus, if a
seller sold to an insolvent buyer and transferred both title and possession he could not reach the goods and consequently became a mere
unsecured creditor of the buyer.
The Code will protect the seller where the insolvent buyer has
obtained both title and possession of the goods, by permitting the
seller in certain situations to reclaim the goods. Where the seller
discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may reclaim the goods within
ten days after the buyer's receipt, or, where the buyer has made a
written misrepresentation of solvency to the seller within the three
months before the delivery, the seller may reclaim without complying
36
with the ten-day requirement since it does not apply in this situation.

official comment.
80 UCC § 2-703, official comment 1.
81 UCC § 2-720.
82 UCC § 2-720, official comment
83 USA §§ 53 (1) (a), 53 (2).
84 USA §§ 53 (1) (b), 53 (2).
85 3 Williston, Sales § 505 (rev. ed. 1948).
85UCC § 2-702 (2).
29 UCC § 2-720,
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The theory of the section is that the receipt of goods on credit by an
insolvent buyer, amounts to a tacit misrepresentation of solvency and
is fraudulent to the seller.3 7 Kentucky has long followed the rule
that a seller may reclaim goods obtained by the buyer through
fraudulent misrepresentations, on the ground that title to the goods
is still vested in the seller, who may elect to rescind the contract and
recover the goods.38 The cases so holding involved misrepresentations
of facts other than solvency, however, the principle stated would
seem to be sufficiently broad to include misrepresentations of solvency.
If there were some doubt as to whether the rule would apply to
misrepresentations of solvency, it seems that it has been removed by
the express provisions of the Code.
The right of reclamation is not absolute and is subject to the rights
of good faith purchasers or lien creditors.39 Further, the successful
reclamation of the goods will most likely place the seller in a better
position than he would have occupied as a mere creditor. Consequently the reclamation excludes any other remedy. 40 The preferential
treatment of the seller as against the other creditors bars any other
claim, since a successful prosecution of any such claim would further
reduce the pro rata recovery by those creditors.
II. The Seller's Remedies for Breach of the Contract
In addition to the rights of a seller with respect to the goods, the
seller is provided specific remedies for the buyer's breach of the contract. These remedies are also dependent upon the existence of various
express conditions. Other than the alteration and modification of the
conditions upon which the remedies depend, the Code makes two
significant changes in the seller's remedies. An express right to
identify goods to the contract after the buyer's breach is provided.
Further, the right to cancel the contract as opposed to the rescission
thereof and the consequences which follow from the cancellation
are also of real importance.
A. The Action for the Price
If the "property" in or "title" to the goods had passed to the buyer
and the buyer had wrongfully neglected or refused to pay for the
goods as provided in the contract the seller was entitled to maintain
37
38 Ibid.

Nashville Grain & Feed Co. v. American Co-Op Ass'n, 203 Ky. 458, 262
S.W. 634 (1924); Dietz's Assignee v. Sutcliffe, 80 Ky. 650, 4 Ky. L.R. 567 (1883).
39 UCC § 2-702 (3).
40 Ibid.

NoTEs

an action for the price of the goods under the Sales Act.41 Also, if the
price were payable on a day certain and had not been paid the seller
42
could maintain an action for the price, irrespective of title passage.
In another instance the seller could maintain the action for the price,
even though title to the goods had not passed. If (1) the goods could
not "readily be resold for a reasonable price" and if (2) the buyer
had not repudiated or notified the seller to cease performance of the
contract at a time when labor and expense of a material amount were
the performance of the contract, the action
necessary to complete
43
could be maintained.
The Code has limited the seller's action for the price to those
cases in which the buyer has failed to make payment as it becomes
due and (1) the buyer has accepted the goods, 44 or (2) the goods are
lost or destroyed after the risk of loss 45 has passed to the buyer,46 or
(8) the goods could not be sold after a "reasonable effort to resell at a
reasonable price" or the circumstances indicate that such an effort
would be unavailing.4 7 It is apparent that neither title passage nor the
appointment of a day certain for payment are material to the maintenance of the action under the Code. However, it is indispensable to
the action that the buyer be in default of payment. In addition to the
default, one of the three conditions enumerated above must also exist.
If the seller is entitled to and does institute proceedings to recover
the price under the Code, the right to resell the goods is retained and
the seller may resell the goods at any time before he collects the
judgment. 48 If the buyer does sell before he collects the judgment,
49
then he must credit the proceeds of the sale to the buyer.
41 USA § 63 (1); see also Louisville Tin & Stove Company v. Lay, 251 Ky.

584, 65 S.W. 2d 1002 (1933), where a seller mistakenly ships goods to another
who accepts and retains them and is held liable for the price under the implied
contract.
42 USA § 63 (2).
43

USA § 63 (3); the latter condition is the essence of USA § 64 (4), which

limited the buyer's liability to the damages sustained by the seller at the time of
the repudiation or notification in some instances. The seller under this section was
not permitted to materially increase the buyer's damages after repudiation or
notification to cease performance.
44UCC § 2-709 (1) (a).
45 UCC §§ 2-509, 2-510 are the sections of the Code which relate to the time
and place at which the risk of loss shifts to the buyer.
4GUCC § 2-709 (1) (a).
47UCC § 2-709 (1) (b); the substitution of the "reasonable effort to resell
at a reasonable price" test for the "not readily resalable" test of the Sales Act
was intended to provide a more objective type test in determining the propriety
of the maintenance of the action for the price. See UCC § 2-709, official comment 3.
48 UCC § 2-709 (2).
49 Ibid.
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B. Action for Non-Acceptance and Repudiation
If, under the Sales Act, a buyer wrongfully neglected or refused
to accept and pay for the goods the seller was permitted to maintain
an action for damages for non-acceptance.50 The amount of damages
recoverable by the seller was dependent upon, first, whether there was
an available market for the goods, and second, the existence or nonexistence of circumstances which resulted in special damages.
Where an available market for the goods existed, the seller's
measure of damages was the difference between the contract price
and the market price at the time or times the goods should have been
accepted, or if no time was fixed, at the time of the refusal to accept,
unless there were circumstances resulting in special damages to the
seller.51 Hence if there were an available market the seller could
recover the price differential as well as special damages. The existing
Kentucky Rule, with respect to special damages in general contract
actions is the well known "contemplation of the parties rule"; 52 however, no case has been found where it was applied in an action
prosecuted under the Sales Act.
Where no market for the goods existed the seller's measure of
damages for non-acceptance was the estimated loss which directly
and naturally resulted, in the ordinary course of events, from the
buyer's breach. 53 Although the seller was permitted to recover such
damages under the Sales Act, he could be required to attempt to
dispose of the goods for any price in order to minimize the damages.
In Kentucky it was so held in a case in which the buyer had wrongfully refused to accept an extraordinary quantity of ice.5 4 In view of
the nature of the goods in this case, the rule might be restricted to
cases involving perishable goods.
These two rules tended to protect the seller in most situations.
The seller, however, was not permitted to increase the buyer's damages
under the Sales Act when he was made aware that the buyer did not
desire completion of the contract. The essence of the provision of the
50USA § 64 (1).
51 USA§ 64 (3). Although the section only provides for damages to be
assessed at the "time' when the goods should have been accepted, the provision
has been generally interpreted to mean the "time and place" they should have
been accepted. See 3 Williston, Sales, § 582 (rev. ed. 1948) and cases cited in
Ftn. 19, including Hawkins v. Midland Flour Milling Co., 236 Ky. 803, 34 S.W.

2d 439 (1930).
52 Kentucky Consumer's Oil Co. v. General Bonded Warehousing Corp., 299
Ky. 161, 184 S.W. 2d 972 (1945); Staves Manufacturing Corp. v. Robertson, 278
Ky. 294, 128 S.W. 2d 745 (1939); Hogg v. Edley, 236 Ky. 142, 32 S.W. 2d 744
(1930).
53 USA § 64 (2).
54
Fruit Grower s Express Company v. Citizens Ice & Fuel Co., 271 Ky. 330,

112 S.W. 2d 54 (1937).
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Sales Act is that the buyer shall be liable to the seller for no greater
damages than the seller would have suffered, had he done nothing
toward the completion of the contract after receiving notice of the
buyer's repudiation or notification to proceed no further. This is
dependant upon the condition that at the time of the notice, labor
and expenses of a material amount would be necessary to fulfill the
obligations.55 Conversely, if the labor and expense necessary to
complete the performance were not of a material amount, the seller
could complete the contract and the buyer would be liable for the
full performance. In case the buyer did give timely notification the
seller was still protected to the extent that in assessing damages for the
breach, the profits the seller would have made, could be considered
under Section 64 (4).
The Code takes as its base line the proposition that the damages
recoverable will be the difference between the contract price and the
market price at the time and place of tender5" To this amount will be
added any incidental damages, 7 but from the total must be subtracted
any expenses which the seller saves as a consequence of the breach.58
If, however, the measure of damages derived in the foregoing manner
is inadequate to place the seller in as good position as performance
would have then the measure of damages is the profit the seller would
have made on a full performance, plus any incidental damages. 59 In
making this determination, allowance for reasonable costs incurred
by the seller due to the buyer's breach may be given;60 however, due
credit for payments or proceeds of resale must be given to the buyer. 61
This section of the Code will apply equally whether or not a market
exists at the time and place of delivery. If a market does exist then
the amount of damages is the difference in the contract price and
market price at the time of tender. If, on the other hand, no market
exists at the time and place of tender, the Courts are given great
leeway in establishing a market price to be utilized in assessing the
damages. 2 Resort may be had to prices at comparable times or in
55
§ 64 (4).
5 USA
UCC § 2-708 (1).

57 UCC § 2-710 provides:

Incidental damages to an aggreived seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, exn-nses or commission incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the
buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or
otherwise resulting from the breach.

58 UCC § 2-708 (1).

GUCC § 2-708 (2).
60 UCC § 2-710, supra note 56.
61 UCC § 2-709 (2).
02 See UCC § 2-708, official comment 1.
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comparable markets.6 3 If the market price is established in this manner the same procedure in assessing the damages will be followed as
if a market had existed. 64
Of course for some articles there will be no market any place as
in the case of items specially manufactured for a particular use. In
such cases the market price would be impossible to establish. The
court then must resort to the alternative of permitting a recovery of
the profits and incidental damages. (Of course if this is the case the
seller's action should be, and no doubt will be, one for the price.) 6
When the buyer wrongfully breaches the contract prior to the time
the goods are finished, the seller has several alternative actions which
be may take under the Code. The only restriction upon his permissible
actions are that he exercise "reasonable commercial judgment."
Exercising such judgment he may (1) complete manufacture, identify
the goods to the contract and then pursue the remedies discussed in
Section C, immediately below, (2) cease manufacture and sell the
components for scrap, or (3) proceed in any other reasonable manner. 66 The emphasis is the unfinished-manufacture cases is shifted
from the materiality of the amount of labor and expenses necessary to
complete manufacture, to the commercial reasonableness of the seller's
action. Further, it should be somewhat less difficult for the seller to
complete the manufacture in such cases and still recover for the
expense incurred in the completion, because the burden of proving
67
that the seller has acted unreasonably is upon the buyer.
The provisions of the Code discussed in this section should substantially eliminate two major problem area encountered under the
Sales Act:
1. The complications encountered in making a determination of
the materiality of labor and expense is not only eliminated, but the
test of "reasonable commercial judgment" which is substituted, lends
itself to a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the transaction, rather than limiting the buyer's liability on a mere determination of materiality. In some cases reasonable commercial judgment
may indicate that manufacture should be completed under the particular circumstances, although a material amount of labor and expense
are necessary to such completion. It should be pointed out that
2-723.
64 With respect to anticipatory repudiation, the market price is to be established as of the date the aggreived party learned of the repudiation. See UCO
§ 2-723 (1).
65 See UCC § 2-709 (1) (b) (seller permitted to maintain action for price
where circumstances indicate that an effort to resell would be unavailing).
66UCC § 2-704 (2).
67
See UCC § 2-704, official comment 2.
63 UCC §
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whether it is commercially reasonable to continue manufacture will
be determined upon the facts as they appeared at the time the seller
68
learns of the breach.
2. Of no little importance is the provision which enables a court
to establish a market price for the goods by resorting to prices in
comparable times and circumstances or in comparable markets when
no market exists at the time and place of delivery. Although this may
present a problem of proof, it should produce a more reliable and less
speculative recovery, and at the same time relieve the parties from
attempting to prove and the courts from deciding what damages will
or will not be the "natural and ordinary result of the buyer's breach"
as would be necessary under the Sales Act when no market exists.
C. The Right to Identify Goods to the Contract
The Sales Act made no express provision for the "identification" of
goods to the contract after the buyers breach. Section 64 (4) will
enable a seller to reach the same result in proper circumstances, when
the seller justifiably completes manufacture of the goods after the
buyer's breach.
Since, as a general rule under the Sales Act, title to the goods did
not pass until the goods were appropriated to the contract,6 9 a seller
was unable to maintain an action for the price of goods which had not
been appropriated to the contract. In a proceeding under section
63 (1), title passage was a condition precedent to such action. Neither
could the seller identify or appropriate goods to the contract without
the consent of the buyer,70 and certainly a buyer who had breached
would not consent to such appropriation, thereby placing title in
himself and enabling the seller to maintain an action for the price of
such goods.
If the goods were not appropriated to the contract at the time of a
breach by the buyer, and there were no available market for the
goods, the seller could tender all the goods contracted for, and if the
buyer refused to accept, the seller could maintain an action for the
price7 ' or for non-acceptance, 72 even though the goods had not been
appropriated to the contract prior to the breach. Similarly, if there
68 Ibid.

69The technical rules passage under the Sales Act are found in §§ 17-19.
If, under the Sales Act, the parties intended, title to specific or ascertained goods
passed when the contract was made. If, however, the goods were unascertained
title did not pass until there was an unconditional appropriation of the goods to
the contract with the assent of the other pary. See specifically § 19, Rule 4.
70 USA § 19, Rule 4.
71USA § 63 (3).

72 USA § 64 (1).
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were a market, the seller could appropriate after the buyer's breach
for the purpose of making tender, and if the tender were refused the
seller could maintain an action for non-acceptance under section 64
(3) as alluded to previously. However, he could not maintain an
action for the price of goods so appropriated since title to them had
not passed. In these cases the seller's action depended upon the
buyer's refusal to accept the goods tendered. 73 Thus, it can be seen
that any effective right of appropriation under the Sales Act which
would enable the seller to maintain an action for the price was
limited to those cases in which the buyer consented, or where the
goods were not readily resalable.
The Code will permit a seller to identify goods to the contract 74
regardless of resalability 75 without any requirement that they be
identified with the consent of the buyer. With the requirements of
the Sales Act eliminated, a seller may identify goods to the contract
after the buyer's breach and resell them7" or in a proper case recover
the price of goods so identified. 77 Further, if the seller is precluded
from maintaining the action for the price because the requirements of
section 2-709 cannot be met (e.g. failing to make reasonable effort to
resell) he will still be able to maintain an action for non-acceptance
or repudiation under section 2-708.
As discussed in the preceding section the seller can also complete
the manufacture of "unfinished goods" and identify them to the contract. When such goods are finished and identified the effect is the
same as if they had been finished before the breach and merely identified afterwards.
D. The Right to Rescind the Entire Contract or Cancel
The right of a seller to rescind only the transfer of title and resume
the property in the goods, then maintain an action for damages for
the breach, has been discussed in the section on the seller's rights
against the goods. The seller under the Sales Act was provided an
additional right of rescission. Under certain conditions he was permitted to rescind the entire contract. If the buyer repudiated the
contract, manifested his inability to perform, or committed a material
73 USA § 68 (8) (refusal to accept gives rise to action for the price, where
there is no available market); USA § 64 (1) (refusal to accept gives rise to action
for nonacceptance, where there is an available market).
74UCC § 2-704 (1) (a).
75 UCC § 2-704, official comment 1.
76 Ibid.
77UCC § 2-709 (1) (a).

NoTEs
breach of the contract, the seller was permitted to rescind the entire
78
contract upon giving the buyer notice of his intention to do so.
This section was applicable only to goods which had not been
delivered to0 the buyer. Delivery to the buyer extinguished the right
7
to rescind.
If the seller did rescind the entire contract he was precluded from
maintaining an action for damages under the contract. 80 In some instances, however, the reseission of the entire contract would give rise
to other rights. As an example, the seller could not stop goods in
transit upon the repudiation of the contract by the buyer,8 ' because
the right could only be exercised upon the insolvency of the buyer.
However, when the buyer repudiated his contract while the goods
were in transit the seller, under section 65, could rescind the contract,
thereby extinguishing any right of the buyer under the contract or
against the goods. In this case, the seller alone had rights with
respect to such goods, and of course, he could stop shipment of them.
The Code, in order to avoid the objection of permitting a seller to
rescind the entire contract and recover damages in addition thereto,
discontinues the use of the word "rescind" and provides instead that
the seller in the four situations in section 2-703, may "cancel" the
contract. The cancellation of the contract under this section does not
preclude an action for damages based upon any right which may have
accrued prior to the cancellation. 82 This provision, therefore, avoids
the judicial interpretation to the effect that it is inconsistent to rescind
the contract and sue thereon for damages.
Other than the dual rights of cancellation and recovery of damages
on the contract, the most significant change in the Code pertaining
to the seller's right to extinguish the contract, is the fact that the seller
may cancel even when the goods are in the possession of the buyer.83
This would not have been possible under the Sales Act which specifically provided that the goods must not have been delivered to the
buyer in order for the seller to rescind the contract. 84
78 USA § 65.
70 Ibid.
80 The inconsistency is a result of the application of principles of general
contract law. See e.g., Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Jayne, 289 Ky. 150,
154, 158 S.W. 2d 398, 400 (1942).
81 3 Williston, Sales § 520 (rev. ed. 1948).
82 See UCC § 2-720, official comment.
83 UCC § 2-703 provides only that the seller may cancel when there has been
a wrongful reiection, revocation of acceptance, failure to make payment due or
repudiation. That the goods have not been delivered to the buyer is not made a
condition upon which the right to cancel depends.
84 USA § 65.
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III. The Buyer's Remedies
The Code broadens appreciably the buyer's remedies. As in the
case of the seller's remedies, so too does the Code lessen the importance of the location of title to goods. Two important new remedies
are provided. The Code allows the buyer to "cover", or procure
substitute goods on the open market, upon the seller's breach.
Secondly, upon the seller's insolvency the buyer now may reach goods
identified to the contract irrespective of the location of title. Under
the Code the principles governing election of remedies do not weigh
so heavily upon the buyer's choice in that he is expressly permitted
to revoke his acceptance and also cancel the contract without impairing his right to damages for its breach. In addition, most of the other
remedies of the buyer, whether predicated upon title to the goods
or in contractual relief, including replevin, conversion or detention of
goods, specific performance, damages for failure to deliver, damages
for breach of warranty, are all retained with clarifying amplification.
A. The Action for Conversion or Detention
Under the Sales Act, if the "property" in the goods had passed to
the buyer under the contract of sale and the seller wrongfully refused
or neglected to deliver the goods, the buyer could maintain any action
which an owner in similar circumstances could maintain, 85 primarily
an action for conversion or detention of the goods. Such action on the
part of the seller constituted both a breach of contract and a tort,
upon either of which an action could be prosecuted.86
The Code makes no specific provision for an action for conversion
or detention. Neither does the Code exclude these remedies.8 7 It
would seem then, that if the technical requirements of title passage
which would be indispensible to either action, are met,88 either action
would be available to the buyer under the Code.
B. The Rights of Rescission and Cancellation
The only express right of rescission of the contract of sale by the
buyer under the Sales Act was for a breach of warranty.8 9 In some
85 USA § 66.
88 See 3 Williston, Sales §§ 595, 596 (rev. ed. 1948) for a discussion of tort
contract liability based upon the seller's wrongful refusal to deliver and the
measure of damages.
87 UCC § 2-711 outlines the remedies of the buyer and no mention is made
of the remedies for conversion or detention. Nothing in th-- official comments
to this section would give the impression, however, that it was intended to
exclude these remedies.
88 UCO § 2-401 (2) sets forth the technical rules relating to title passage.
89 USA § 69 (1) (d).
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instances a breach of the contract, other than a breach of warranty
may justify rescission by the buyer under general contract law.90 No
such right, however, was conferred by the Sales Act. The right to
rescind under the Sales Act was qualified in that the buyer could
rescind with respect to goods accepted, only if he did not know of
the breach of warranty at the time of the acceptance. 91 In addition
the buyer was required to give notice of his intention to rescind
within a reasonable time after his election to do so, and return or
offer to return the goods in substantially as good condition as they
were when the property in them passed. Any deterioration of the
goods would not preclude the buyer's right of rescission,
if the
92
deterioration resulted from the breach of warranty.
The Code permits the buyer to "cancel" the contract if the seller
(1) fails to deliver, or (2) repudiates, or when the buyer (1) rightfully
rejects the goods, or (2) justifiably revokes his acceptance. 93 The
cancellation by the buyer has the same effect as does a cancellation
by the seller, in that such action discharges his obligations of performance, but does not preclude his other remedies.9 4 In addition to
the right of cancellation the buyer not only may recover the portion
of the purchase price he has paid, but also may procure "cover",
recover damages for non-delivery, reach the goods if the seller has
become insolvent, or in a proper case obtain specific performance or
replevy the goods.9 5
C. The Right to Cover
The express remedy of "cover" provided by the Code is essentially
new. In effect it permits a buyer who has been denied the goods
contracted for to procure substitute goods in the open market and
protects him in so doing. It should be pointed out that under the
Sales Act if title bad passed the buyer was limited to the actions of
conversion, replevin or for wrongful detention, and if title had not
passed he could maintain an action for failure to deliver. In neither
instance was the buyer expressly authorized or permitted to procure
substitute goods, regardless of the urgency of his need. If the buyer
0OBlack Motor Co. v. Green, 258 Ky. 72, 79 S.W. 2d 409 (1935)
implication).
9' USA § 69 (3).

92 Ibid.

(by

93UCC § 2-711 (1). On the manner and effect of a rightful rejection and
duty of the buyer with respect to rejected goods in his possession, see UCC § 2-602.
Concerning revocation of acceptance see UCC § 2-608 and part III, subtopic H,
In! ra.r4
UCC § 2-720.
95 See UCC § 2-711. On recovery of goods on seller's insolvency, see UCC
§ 2-502.
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did obtain substitute goods, this almost certainly would not increase
his recovery, even if the price paid exceeded the contract price. The
ability to purchase substitute goods would be evidence that an available market existed, in which case the recovery would be the contract
price-market price differential plus any special damages.00 He would
be entitled to the additional cost only as special damages, in which
case it would be incumbent upon him to prove that the acquisition
of the substitute goods in the event of the seller's breach was in the
7
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made.
The Code approaches this problem with the paramount concern
being the practical effect of the breach upon the buyer who presumably needs the goods. Upon the seller's breach, the buyer is permitted
to procure substitute goods to meet his essential need; and the
defaulting seller is held liable for the damages which the buyer
sustained as a result of the breach, including reasonable expenses
incurred in effecting the cover.9 8
Substitute goods may be procured if the purchase is made in good
faith, without unreasonable delay, and the purchase price paid is
reasonable.0 9 If the buyer fulfills these requirements he can recover
from the seller the difference in the cost of the substitute goods and
the contract price as well as incidental and consequential damages,10
less the expenses saved as a consequence of the seller's breach. 101 If
the buyer chooses not to cover, when cover is available, damages
which he sustained as a result of his particular need will not be
recoverable,' 0 2 since consequential damages
are limited to those which
03
cover.
by
obviated
been
have
not
could
D. The Action for Damages for Non-Delivery
The Sales Act provided a buyer with the action for damages for
non-delivery when the property in the goods had not passed and the
9

OUSA § 67 (3).

See 3 Williston, Sales H8 599-599b (rev. ed. 1948).
98 UCC § 2-715 (1), infra note 100.
99 UCC § 2-712 (1).
100 UCC § 2-715 (1) & (2) provides in part:
(1) Incidental damages . . . include expenses reasonably incurred...
in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense
incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages . . . include (a) any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at
the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.
101 UCC § 2-712 (2).
102 UCC § 2-712, official comment 3.
103 UCC § 2-715 (2), supra note 100.
97
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seller wrongfully refused to deliver the goods.10 4 The measure of
damages for the wrongful refusal to deliver was dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of an available market. If there were an
available market, the measure was the contract price-market price
differential at the time or times when the goods should have been
delivered, plus any special damages sustained. 0 5 If no market existed
the buyer could recover the loss directly and naturally resulting from
the seller's breach. 10
To implement the buyer's primary remedy of cover, the Code
provides that the buyer is entitled to recover the contract price-market
price differential at the time the buyer learns of the breach, 10 7 rather
than at the time there should have been tender of delivery as provided
in the Sales Act. The primary purpose of using the time the buyer
learns of the breach in measuring the damages, is to make his recovery
commensurate with the amount which it would have cost to cover, had
he done so. 10 8 The place at which the price is to be determined is the
place for tender, except where the buyer has rejected the goods, or
revoked his acceptance, in which case the place of arrival will be
used.109
As in the case of other recoveries by the buyer or seller, the
damages may include incidental and consequential damages, but
these damages must be offset by the expenses saved as a consequence
of the seller's breach. 110
No problem is encountered under the Code in proving or making
a determination of the damages which directly and naturally result
from the seller's breach, if there is no available market, as would have
been the case under the Sales Act. The market price may be proved
in this situation by resort to evidence of prices in comparable times
and circumstances or in comparable markets."' Further, where there
is a scarcity of goods, opinion evidence may be admissible, 112 but if
this be the case, specific performance may be desirable remedy.
The action for non-delivery under the Code is an alternative to
the remedy of "cover", and may be prosecuted only to the extent that
cover has not been procured. 113 The remedies are compatible, how104

USA § 67 (1).

10 USA § 67 (3).

106 USA § 67 (2).
107 UCC § 2-713 (1).
108 UCC § 2-713, official comment 1.
109 UCC § 2-713 (2).
110 UCC § 2-713 (1).

111 UCC § 2-723, official comment.
112 UCC § 2-713, official comment 3.
113 UCC § 2-713, official comment 5.
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ever, and may be pursued together so long as complete cover is not
procured.
14
E. The Action for Breach of Warranty"

If, under the Sales Act, a buyer accepted goods without knowledge
of a breach of warranty," 5 four alternative actions were available to
him. The buyer could (1) keep the goods and set up the breach by
way of recoupment in diminution of the price, (2) keep the goods
and bring an action for damages for the breach, (3) refuse to accept
the goods if title had not passed, and maintain an action for the
breach, or (4) rescind the contract and recover the purchase price
16
paid."
The right to rescind was not available to a buyer who knew of the
breach when he accepted the goods. 117 Further, if the buyer did
rescind, he was required to notify the seller of his intention within a
reasonable time after his election to do so, and return or offer to
return the goods.
Where there had been a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer
was limited to a choice of any one of the remedies. Once he had
selected and been granted relief under any one of the four methods
outlined above, he was barred from any other remedy.""
The measure of damages for a breach of warranty under the Sales
Act was the loss directly and naturally resulting from the breach," 9
except in the case of a breach of warranty of quality. 120 In the latter
instance the measure was the difference in the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would 2 have had if they had answered
the warranty plus special damages.' '
The Code treats a breach of warranty 2 2 as any other breach of
contract with respect to accepted goods.123 Where the buyer has
accepted non-conforming goods two courses of action are open to him.
114 For an extensive discussion of the field of warranties under the Sales Act
and the Code including types of warranties, how warranties arise, extent of warranties, disclaimers parties to whom warranties extend, etc., see Note "The Uniform
Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection under Warranty Law", 49
Ky. L.J. (1960).
115 Warranties under the Sales Act, types and how they arise are governed

by H 11-15.

116 USA § 69.
117 USA § 69 (3).

118 USA § 69 (2).
"19USA
§ 69 (6).
12 0 See USA § 15 concerning the conditions upon which a warranty of

quality arises.
121
122

USA § 69 (7).

Types of warranties, extent of warranties, disclaimers, etc., under the Code
are governed by UCC §§ 2-312-2-318.
123 UCC § 2-714, official comment 2.

19601

NOTES

First, he may revoke his acceptance and maintain an action for
damages 124 in certain situations (discussed infra, subtopic H), or
second, he may maintain an action for the breach without revoking
his acceptance. Section 2-714 of the Code is directed specifically to the
situation where the time for revocation of acceptance has lapsed,12 5
and the buyer must resort to an action for damages for the breach.
Two measures of damages are provided in such cases. For any breach
with respect to accepted goods, including a breach of warranty,' 2
the damages may be "determined in any manner which is reasonable."'1 7 The difference in the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted is the
measure specifically provided for a breach of warranty. 2 8 In addition
to the damages determined by either of the two methods, in a proper
case the buyer may recover incidental and consequential damages. 2 9
It will be noted that the Code does not differentiate between types
of warranties in actions for breach as far as the measure of damages is
concerned, as did the Sales Act. The Code also makes explicit the
time and place at which the value of the goods is to be determined,
i.e., the time and place of acceptance. The Sales Act specified only the
time of valuation, and that was only in the case of a breach of
warranty of quality.
F. The Actions of Specific Performance and Replevin
Under the Sales Act, the buyer could obtain specific performance
of the contract for "specific or ascertained" goods, 130 and the courts
were given very broad discretion in rendering such decrees. 131
The Code, on the other hand, does not require that the goods be
specific or ascertained, however it does requires that specific performance be decreed only when the goods are "unique," or in other
proper circumstances.132 The test was changed for the purpose of
furthering a more liberal attitude than some courts had shown toward
granting specific performance. 3 3 It would seem, however, that unless
the courts very liberally interpret the phrase "other proper circumUCC § 2-608 and official comment 1.
UCC § 2-714, official comment 1.
1 0 UCC § 2-714, official comment 3.
124
125

2

127 UCC § 2-714 (1).

UCC § 2-714 (2).
12 9 UCC § 2-714 (3); In addition see UCO § 2-715, official comments 1-5.
0
128

13 USA § 68.
131 Under USA § 68 a court exercising the powers of a court of equity may

"if it thinks fit", render a decree of specific performance of a contact for the sale
of specic or ascertained goods.
132 UCC § 2-716 (1).
133 UCC § 2-716, official comment 1.
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stances" the effect of the Code is merely to remove the requirement
that the goods be specific or ascertained, and incorporate a requirement of uniqueness. This is true even with the "other proper circumstances" test apparently, since the only examples noted which fall
within the test are cases where goods non-unique in character become
34
unique because of scarcity.
Under the Sales Act a Buyer was able to replevy goods only if the
property in them had passed to him. 3 5 The Code, in furtherance of
the intent to lessen the importance of the passage of title, has removed
this requirement. A buyer under the Code will be able to replevy
goods which have been identified to the contract, if after a reasonable
effort he is unable to effect cover, or the circumstances indicate that
36
the effort would be unavailing.
G. The Right to Reach Goods on the Seller's Insolvency
In addition to the rights of a buyer to specific performance or
replevin, both of which permit him to reach the goods, the buyer
under the Code is given the right to the goods upon the insolvency
of the seller under certain circumstances. 3 7 This right is a correlary
to the seller's right to reach the goods on the buyer's insolvency,
rather than become a mere unsecured creditor. 38 In order for the
buyer to reach goods identified to the contract upon the seller's
insolvency, he must have paid part of the purchase price and obtained
a special property in the goods. 139 Further, the buyer must make and
keep good a tender of any unpaid portion of the purchase price.' 40
The right to goods upon the seller's insolvency is limited to the extent
that the buyer must have become insolvent within ten days after the
receipt of the first installment of the price,141 and that the goods be
conforming goods, if the identification thereof was made by the buyer
himself. 142 This is true not withstanding the fact that the buyer may
obtain a special property in non-conforming goods which he himself
identifies to the contract. 143 This provision is intended to prevent a
2.

134 See UCC § 2-713, official comment 3 and UCC § 2-716, official comment
'35 USA § 66.
136 UCC § 2-716

137 UCC §

2-502.

(3).

138 On the seller's right to goods on the buyer's insolvency, see subtopic E,
under Seller's Rights Against the Goods, supra.
139As to the requirement that the buyer has paid part of the purchase price
see UCC § 2-501 (1). The buyer obtains a special property in the goods when
identified to the contract. UCC § 2-501 (1).
140 UCC § 2-502 (1).
141 Ibid.
142 UCO § 2-502 (2).
43
' See UCC § 2-501 (1).
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what
buyer from obtaining goods superior in quality or quantity than
44
he contracted for, when he makes the identification himself.'
Neither title passage nor the fact that the buyer is entitled to
specific performance is necessary for the buyer to reach the goods
under this section. The insolvency of the seller within the ten day
period is sufficient. Under the Sales Act, however, if title had not
passed, the buyer could not have replevied the goods. Neither could
be have obtained specific performance on the basis of insolvency
alone, to the detriment of the other creditors. 145 Hence, the buyer
under the Code is in a far more favorable position than was the buyer
under the Sales Act in this situation.
H. The Right to Revoke Acceptance
Under the Sales Act, a buyer accepting goods without knowledge
of a breach of warranty, could keep the goods and recover from the
seller the loss sustained as a result of the breach,'146 or rescind the
contract and recover the purchase price paid. 4 7 These remedies were
alternative and the rescission would bar the action for any damages
sustained.148 If the buyer accepted goods with knowledge of the
breach of warranty, he could only recover damages, or recoup149the
price, because a rescission was expressly barred in this situation.
The Code provides a new remedy for a buyer who accepts nonconforming goods. The buyer is permitted to "revoke acceptance" of a
lot or commercial unit of non-conforming goods, if the non-conformity
substantially impairs its value. The cases in which acceptance may be
revoked are: (1) if non-conforming goods were accepted on the
reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be cured, and
it has not been seasonably cured; or (2) if he accepted goods without
knowledge of the non-conformity and his acceptance was induced
by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance, or by the seller's
assurances. 150 The revocation of acceptance under this section does
not bar an action for damages, since the right of revocation and an
action for damages are cumulative rather than alternative. 51 The
official comment 3.
Although not decided under the Sales Act, the prevailing rule may be
found in George E. Warren Company v. Black Coal Company, 85 W. Va. 684, 102
S.E. 672 (1920); Pomeroy, Specific Performance, § 26 (3d ed. 1926); cf. 49 Am.
Jur., Specific Performance, § 13 at 23 n. 1. (1943).
140 USA § 69 (1) (a) & (b); the recovery could be either by way of
recoupment, or in an action for damages.
'47USA § 69 (1) (d).
144 UCC § 2-501,
145

148

140

USA § 69 (2).
USA § 69 (3).

250 UCC § 2-608.
151 UCC § 2-608, official comment 1.
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net effect of this section is not only to permit the buyer to accept
goods which he knows are non-conforming, then revoke his acceptance,
but also enables him to recover damages sustained as a result of the
breach. This is a most abrupt departure from the underlying theories
of title and recission which dominated the drafting of the Sales Act.
It is, however, in harmony with the remedy of cancellation of the
contract, with the additional right of a subsequent action for damages
for the breach. It is in furtherance of the policy of the Code to shift
the emphasis from the technical and theoretical conceptions of title
and recission to the practical effect of a breach of contract upon the
party adversely affected.
The most important limitation upon the exercise of the right of
revocation, is that the buyer must notify the seller of the revocation
or the time at which the nonwithin a reasonable time after discovery 152
conformity should have been discovered.
William A. Logan
152 UCC § 2-608 (2).

